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Article 3

ARKANSAS
J. Mark Robinette*
There is very little to report in Arkansas this year. The 92nd
General Assembly made no substantive changes to the law of oil and
gas in Arkansas. In addition, the federal courts produced no
significant developments.1 In state court, there were two notable
cases.
The case of Arkansas Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, began as an
examination of the Oil and Gas Commission’s authority regarding
compulsory leasing and pooling but ended with a bizarre twist. In the
administrative proceeding, SWN Arkansas Production Company,
LLC sought to show that the leases of two mineral owners were "selfdealing, non-arm's length" transactions.2 These owners received a
25% royalty under the alleged self-dealt leases, while SWN gave no
more than a 1/7 royalty in leases it negotiated in the unit.3 The
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V6.I3.3
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1. Smith v. SEECO, 922 F.3d 398 (8th Cir. 2019) (deciding the only oil and gas
case in the federal courts on procedural grounds with no special impact on the law
of oil and gas).
2. Id. at 409.
3. Id.
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Commission sided with SWN, and the mineral owners appealed to
Pulaski County Circuit Court pursuant to the Arkansas Administrative
Procedures Act.4
During the appeal to the circuit court, the Arkansas Supreme
Court issued the opinion of Board of Trustees of the University of
Arkansas v. Andrews. This opinion held that the State of Arkansas
cannot waive its sovereign immunity via laws enacted by the General
Assembly.5 The Commission moved to dismiss the appeal utilizing
Andrews to argue that being named a defendant in circuit court under
the Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act violated the sovereign
immunity doctrine.6 The Circuit Court of Pulaski County granted the
Commission’s motion to dismiss, but not before holding that the lack
of a right of review of administrative action in light of the Andrews
decision rendered the entire Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act
unconstitutional.7
The Arkansas Supreme Court took the Commission’s appeal
from the circuit court.8 Using a clever pivot on the issue of the
Commission’s status as a party to the appeal to circuit court, the Court
found that the Commission was not a defendant in the action. Instead,
the Commission was “akin to a trial court in an appellate proceeding;
it has no vested interest in the outcome of the appeal other than
whether its decision is upheld.”9 As a result, the Court abrogated and
remanded the circuit court’s opinion.10
The decision was a sensible compromise allowing the
continuing operation of the Oil & Gas Commission. If the trial court’s
4. Id. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72- A-2(j)(1)(c) (2019) (requiring an applicant
seeking force pooling to provide information on the highest bonus and royalty
known in the unit); ARK. CODE ANN. §15-72-304(b)(4) (explaining this is the basis
under which an unleased mineral owner who fails to affirmatively elect to participate
in the unit gets compensated for transfer of his rights under); Walls v. Arkansas Oil
& Gas Comm’n, 390 S.W.3d 88 (Ark. 2012) (explaining information about the
“highest” bonus and royalty is only an evidentiary requirement, then the information
is then subject to “reasonable consideration and a reasonable basis” and is not “fair
market value.” As such, some mineral owners subject to force pooling react by
entering into leases with entities they own at higher terms than those proposed by
the applicant. This case is a test of how far mineral owners who self-deal may go).
5. Ark. Oil and Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 564 S.W.3d 248, 250 (Ark. 2018)
(explaining the Arkansas Constitution provides that “[t]he State of Arkansas shall
never be made a defendant in any of her courts”); ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20.
6. Board of Trustees v. Andrews, 535 S.W.3d 616, 622–23 (Ark. 2018).
7. Arkansas Oil and Gas Comm’n, 564 S.W.3d at 250–51.
8. See id. at 253.
9. Id. at 255.
10. Id.
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decision had stood, it would practically end the functionality of all
state administrative agencies. In addition, the trial court opinion
would require an amendment of the Arkansas Constitution. The
language of the Constitution is very clear, and it was the basis of the
Andrews decision. Unfortunately, the merits of the underlying issue
in the Hurd case are not yet reported, though an appeal is pending.
A class was successfully certified for thirty-six persons in a
claim against a gas producer in Stephens Production Company v.
Mainer. The trial court certified the class as those underpaid royalties
on “proceeds” leases within a certain production unit in Franklin
County, Arkansas.11 The gas producer’s resistance to the class action
certification was principally the size of the class.12 In a prior case
cited by the producer, a class of seventeen persons failed to meet the
numerosity requirement of Arkansas’s Rule Civil Procedure 23
regarding class actions.13 The Court reiterated that it has no brightline test on the exact number needed to satisfy the numerosity
requirement and that “common sense” controls.14 Not elaborating on
this standard of common sense, the Court instead noted there was no
abuse of discretion by the trial court.15 More importantly, in a close
case of whether or not there is numerosity, erring on the side of
certification is favored by the Court because it is possible to decertify
the class at a later date.16
Justices Wood, Kemp, and Womack dissented from the
majority’s opinion.17 The thrust of the dissent was that there were no
findings by the trial court on “geographic dispersion of class members,
the size of individual claims, the financial resources of the class
members, or the ability of claimants to institute individual suits.”18
Without these findings, the dissent would have found that the trial
court abused its discretion.19
Stephens Production Company seems to allow a presumption
that lessors in a production unit under a common lessor are a viable
class of plaintiffs. If so, this may result in a new round of litigation of
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Stephens Prod. Co. v. Mainer, 571 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Ark. 2019).
Id.
Id. at 908.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 910.
Id.
Id.
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“micro” class actions. One could certainly imagine the use of this
tactic in both royalty disputes within units and implied covenant cases
within units in Arkansas.

